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Abstract
We provide, and perform a risk theoretic statistical analysis of, a dataset that is 75 percent larger
than the previous best dataset on nuclear incidents and accidents, comparing the three measures
of severity: INES (International Nuclear Event Scale), NAMS (Nuclear Accident Magnitude Scale)
and dollar losses. The rate of nuclear accidents with damage above 20 MM 2013 USD (normalized
by the number of reactors in operation) has decreased from the 1970s until the present time. Along
the way, the rate dropped significantly after Chernobyl (April, 1986) and is expected to be roughly
stable around a current level (in 2015) of 0.002 to 0.003 events per plant per year. The distribution
of damage sizes appears to have undergone a regime change shortly after the Three Mile Island
major accident (March, 1979). The median damage size became approximately 3.5 times smaller,
but the tail became much heavier, such that it is well described by a Pareto distribution with
parameter α ≈ 0.55. In fact, the damage of the largest event (Fukushima, 11 March, 2011) is equal
to near 60 percent of the total damage of all 174 accidents in our database since 1946. We also
document a statistically significant runaway disaster regime in NAMS (radiation release) data as
well as a related runaway disaster regime in damage sizes, which we associate with the “dragon-
king” phenomenon. With the current model and in terms of dollar losses, there is a 50% chance
that (i) a Fukushima event (or larger) occurs in the next 50 years, (ii) a Chernobyl event (or larger)
occurs in the next 27 years and (iii) a TMI event (or larger) occurs in the next 10 years. Further,
smaller but still expensive (≥ 20 MM 2013 USD) incidents will occur with a frequency of about one
per year. Finally, we find that the INES scale is inconsistent in terms of both damage and NAMS
(radiation release) values. For the damage values to be consistent, the Fukushima disaster would
need to be between an INES level of 10 and 11, rather than the maximum level of 7.
Lexicography of acronyms:
CCDF: complementary cumulative distribution function
CDF: cumulative distribution function
CPP: Compound Poisson Process
DK: dragon-king
GLM: Generalized Linear Model
IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency
INES: International Nuclear Event Scale
MLE: maximum likelihood estimation
MM: million (roman numerals)
NAMS: Nuclear Accident Magnitude Scale
NLM: nonlinear regression model
PDF: probability density function
PSA: probabilistic safety analysis
USD: US dollars
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1 Introduction
The industry-standard approach to the evaluation of the risk of nuclear accidents uses a bottom-up
technique called probabilistic safety analysis (PSA). PSA requires the definition of failure scenarios to
which probabilities and damage values are assigned. The reliability of PSA depends on the inclusiveness
of scenarios as well as correct modelling of possible cascade effects, in the presence of unavoidable
uncertainties. It is thus perhaps not surprising that there has been a number of incidents and accidents
in the history of civil nuclear energy that failed to be properly anticipated, and in particular for cascades
to be under appreciated. In [26], it was found that the probability assessments were fraught with
unrealistic assumptions, severely underestimating the probability of accidents. In [5], the chairman of
the World Association of Nuclear Operators stated that the nuclear industry is overconfident when
evaluating risk and that the severity of accidents are often underreported.
Instead of entering this quagmire, several studies have used a “top-down” approach, performing
statistical analysis of historical data. These studies [39, 21, 36, 19, 16] and others have almost univer-
sally found that the PSA dramatically underestimates the risk of accidents. The IAEA (International
Atomic Energy Agency) provides the INES (International Nuclear Event Scale) measure of accident
severity (related to radiation released). This is the standard scale used to talk about nuclear acci-
dents. However, the INES has been censured (scores are crude, inconsistent, only available for a small
number of events, etc.) not only in statistical studies, but by the industry itself [5, 12]. As noted by
The Guardian newspaper, it is indeed remarkable (sic. astonishing) that the IAEA does not publish a
historical database of INES events [4]. However, given that the IAEA has the dual objective of pro-
moting and regulating the use of nuclear energy, one should not take the full objectivity of the INES
data for granted. Independent studies are necessary to avoid possible conflicts of interest associated
with misaligned incentives.
Presumably for lack of better data sources, a number of statistical studies such as [19, 16] have used
the INES data to make statements about both the severity and frequency of accidents. Here, we also
perform a statistical analysis of nuclear incidents and accidents, but we refrain from using the INES
data directly. Instead, we use the estimated damage value in USD (US dollars) as the common metric
that allows one to compare often very different types of incidents. This database has more than three
times the number of accidents compared with studies using solely the INES data, providing a much
better basis for statistical analysis and inference. In contrast, the small number of known accidents
with an INES scale makes their statistical analysis questionable. Moreover, because radiation releases
may translate into very different levels and spread of contamination of the biosphere depending on
local circumstances, the quantification of damage in USD terms is more useful and provides a better
comparative tool.
According to PSA specialists, the gaps between PSA-specific results and global statistical data
mentioned above seem to exist in the eyes of observers who ignore the limitations in scope that apply
to almost all PSA. In this view, there is nothing wrong with the PSA methodology in general, but
PSA applications are often restricted to normal operation and/or to internal initiating events. In
this sense, there is indeed a gap between the limited scope of PSA and the wide field of challenges to
nuclear power plants. There is thus a need for more comprehensive PSA applications [29, 24] to include
the uncertainties concerning the PSA numbers as well as a clear delineation of what they represent
(absolute values, relative values, relative contributions...) given that the PSAs of facilities differ in
their methodology and assumptions (even when following the applicable standards).
Moreover, because of the uniqueness of each reactor, some nuclear experts say that assigning
risk to a particular nuclear power plant is impossible [1, 2]. A further argument is that the series of
accidents form a non-stationary series in particular because the industry has been continuously learning
from past accidents, implementing procedures and upgrading each time to fix the problem when a
vulnerability was found especially via accidents. For instance, in the very instructive presentation of
Jukka Laaksonen (Vice President of Rusatom Overseas) [25], one can learn that the loss of criticality
control in the fast breeder reactor EBR-I (1.7MWe) that started operation in 1951 on a test site
in the Idaho desert led to a mandatory reactor design principle to always provide a negative power
coefficient of reactivity when a reactor is producing power; the Windscale accident in 1957 catalyzed
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the establishment of the general concept of multiple barriers to prevent radioactive releases; the Three
Mile Island accident in 1979 led to plant specific full-scope control room simulators, plant specific
PRA models for finding and eliminating risks and new sets of emergency operating instructions; the
Fukushima-Daiichi accident in 2011 is pushing towards designs that ensure decay heat removal without
any AC power for extended times... As a consequence, each new accident occurs supposedly on a nuclear
plant that is not exactly the same as for the previous accident, and so on. This leads to the concept
that nuclear risks are unknowable because one does not have a fixed reference frame to establish reliable
statistics [3].
In contrast, we propose that the best (and most independent from possible conflicting incentives)
dataset on the pool of reactors can be analysed by suitable statistical methods developed from risk
theory, as soon as sufficient care is applied to ascertain the effect of possible non-stationarity and to
test for statistical significance. In particular, stochastic models aiming at describing both the frequency
and severity of events, as in [21, 39], offer very useful guidelines for the statistical analyses. In this
spirit, Burgherr et al. [13] write that “the comparative assessment of accident risks is a key component
in a holistic evaluation of energy security aspects and sustainability performance associated with our
current and future energy system.” This constitutes the standard approach that insurance companies
rely upon when quoting prices to cover the risk of their clients, even when the estimation of risk
appears very difficult and non-stationary. Indeed, one could also argue that people and firms learn
from their past accidents and thus improve their safeguards, so that statistical loss analysis would be
doomed due again to an intrinsic non-stationarity of continuously evolving entities. But it has been
demonstrated repeatedly in actuarial sciences that, notwithstanding learning and adaptation, robust
statistical regularities can be unearthed. This is the stance we take in this article.
In the next section, we describe the data used in our analyses. Section 3 estimates the rate of
events and proposes simple models to account for the evolution of the nuclear plant industry. Section
4 analyses the distribution of losses. Section 5 compares the INES and NAMS values for the severity of
accidents and exhibits evidence of exceptional events that are statistically different from their smaller
siblings. They are referred to as “dragon-kings” (DK). Section 6 combines the different empirical
analyses of previous sections on the rate of events, the severity distribution and the identification of
the DK regime to model the total future damage distribution and to determine the expected yearly
damage. Section 7 concludes.
2 Data
We define an “accident” as an unintentional incident or event at a nuclear energy facility that led to
either one death (or more) or at least $50,000 in property damage. This definition has been used before
in the peer-reviewed energy studies literature [41]. We then proceeded to compile an original database
of as many nuclear energy accidents as possible over the period 1950 to 2014. We searched for the
words “nuclear energy,” “nuclear electricity,” “nuclear power,” “atomic energy,” “atomic power,” and
“nuclear” in the same sentence as the words “accident,” “disaster,” “incident,” “failure,” “meltdown,”
“explosion,” “spill,” and “leak.” To be included in our database, an accident must have involved
nuclear energy at the production/generation, transmission, and distribution phase. This means it
must have occurred at a nuclear energy facility, its associated infrastructure, or within its fuel cy-
cle (mine, transportation by truck or pipeline, enrichment facility, manufacturing plant, etc.). The
accident had to be verified by a published source or sources, some of them reported in the peer-
reviewed literature but others coming from press releases, project documents, public utility commis-
sion filings, reports, and newspaper articles in English. We calculated the “cost” of the accident to
encompass total economic losses such as destruction of property, emergency response, environmen-
tal remediation, evacuation, lost product, fines, court and insurance claims, and these amounts were
adjusted to 2013 US dollars. In the case where there is a loss of life, we add a lost “value of sta-
tistical life” of 6 MM 2013USD per death to the other estimated losses. While imperfect and full
of controversies, this has the advantage of leading to a single US dollar metric associated to each
event that combines all possible negative effects of the accidents. The 6 MM 2013USD figure is cho-
sen as a lower bound of the value of statistical life reported by various US agencies (Environmental
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Protection Agency, Food and Drug Administration, Transportation Department) (see Ref. [9] at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/business/economy/17regulation.html?_r=0 and links to
the corresponding US agency reports).
As mentioned, such an incremental approach to database building has been widely utilized in the
peer-reviewed energy studies literature. Flyvbjerg et al. built their own sample of 258 transportation
infrastructure projects worth about $90 billion [17, 18]. Ansar et al. [8] built their own database of 45
large dams in 65 different countries to assess cost overruns. Also investigating cost overruns, Sovacool
et al. [44, 43] compiled a database consisting of 401 electricity projects built between 1936 and 2014
in 57 countries which constituted 325,515 megawatts (MW) of installed capacity and 8,495 kilometers
of transmission lines.
Our unique dataset contains the event date (ranging from 1946 until 2014), location, damage values
(174 values measured in 2013 USD millions (MM)), and incomplete values for INES scores (72 values)
and Nuclear Accident Magnitude Scale (NAMS) scores (33 values from [36]). Table 1 lists the 15 largest
damage events with the date, location, damage in MM 2013USD, INES score, and NAMS score.
We have significantly updated the dataset used by previous studies; now containing 174 events
whereas the previous version of the dataset used in [39, 21] had only 102 points. As is typically the
case in data such as this, there is an event severity level below which events are less frequently reported,
or even noticed. In our study of the tails of the distribution of losses, as in [21] we use a threshold of
20MM 2013USD. The damage value and INES scores plotted over time are given in fig. 1.
It is important to judge the number of accidents relative to the so called volume of exposure; in
this case, the number of reactors in operation. This data was taken from [7] and is plotted in fig. 2.
The number of reactors in operation grew sharply until 1990 after which it stabilized. The stable level
has been supported by growth in Asia, compensating for decline in Western Europe. A steep drop is
observed in the Asian volume where, following Fukushima in 2011, all of Japan’s reactors were shut
down temporarily until further notice [33].
3 Rate of Events
We observe Nt = 0, 1, 2, . . . events each year for the vt nuclear plants in operation for years t =
1970, 1971, . . . , 2014. The annual observed frequencies of accidents per operating facility are λ̂t =
Nt
vt
.
The observed frequencies are plotted in fig. 2. The rate of events has decreased, with the rate of
decrease becoming smaller over time. The running rate estimate,
λ̂RUNt0,t1 =
t1∑
t=t0
Nt
vt
, (1)
used in [21] is plotted for t0 = 1970 and t1 = 1970, 1971, . . . , 2014. In the presence of a decreasing
rate of events, this running estimate overestimates the rate of events for recent times. To avoid this
bias and to evaluate the trend, we consider another approach. We assume that Nt are independently
distributed Pois(λtvt). The Poisson model features no interaction between events, which is sensible as
separate nuclear events should occur independently. The changing rate of events is accomodated by a
log-linear model for the Poisson rate parameter,
λGLMt = E
[
Nt
vt
]
= exp(β0 + β1(t− t0)), (2)
for given t0 < t and parameters β0, β1. This is the so-called Generalized Linear Model (GLM) for
Poisson Counts [30] and may be estimated by maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) (using in R:glm).
To consider a more flexible model, we drop the assumption that the counts follow a Poisson distribution,
and instead model the observed annual frequencies λ̂t with a nonlinear regression model (NLM),
λt = exp(β0 + β1(t− t0)
β2) + ǫ , (3)
allowing for a nonlinear transformation of time with β2. This model is estimated by numerically
minimizing the squared residuals (using in R:nls). This estimate is the MLE if the errors ǫ are i.i.d
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Normally distributed. Both the GLM and NLM models were estimated from 1970 until 2014 and from
1980 until 2014. The estimates are given in table 2 and plotted in fig. 2. The two GLM estimates are
in good agreement and highly significant. The NLM estimate starting in 1970 differs from the GLM
estimates, but the one starting in 1980 is in perfect agreement. Thus three of the four estimates are in
agreement, indicating that the Poisson model choice is robust. It is clear that there was a significant
reduction in accidents over a period of at least 30 years.
To consider the sensitivity of the estimated rate in 2014 to the starting point t0, we estimate the
GLM for starting points ranging from 1970 through 2000. The predicted value of these regressions
at 2014 are plotted in fig. 2. For t0 from 1970 through 1985 – approaching the Chernobyl disaster –
the estimated value is stable. After Chernobyl (April 1986), the estimated endpoint grows, indicating
that the rate may no longer be decreasing. Indeed, for t0 below 1985 the p-value for the test that
H0 : β1 = 0 in the GLM model is less than 0.1, and for t0 above 1985 the p-value is greater than
1. Considering the cumulative number of events in fig. 2, it appears that the slope has been constant
since the number of operating plants roughly stabilized in 1990. This suggests that the rate of events
has stabilized been stable at a level of ̂λRUN1990,2014 = 0.0034 (0.0006), at least since 1990.
To further diagnose the change that occurred around Chernobyl, in fig. 3 we replot the first panel
of fig. 2, but with points giving rate estimates for each two years (this is less noisy), and two separate
GLM regressions (eq. 2) for the periods before and after Chernobyl. It is clear that there was a regime
change in rate. In fact, the combined AIC of the two fits in fig. 3 is 159, which is superior to the
AIC of 165 for the single fit over the entire period (1970 to 2014) in fig. 2. The parameter estimates
of these GLM regressions are given in tab. 2. The decrease in rate post-Chernobyl is not statistically
significant.
From the above, we recommend conservative estimates of λ̂2014 between 0.002 and 0.003. Thus
despite having 70 percent more events in the dataset than in [21], we find a similar rate estimate.
Further, we expect the rate to remain relatively stable.
As in [21], a significant difference between the frequency of events across regions remains. In table 3,
one sees that the running estimate of the annual rate varies by as much as a factor of 3 across the
regions.
4 Distribution of Damage
Damage sizes (measured in million (MM) 2013USD) are considered to be i.i.d random variables
Xi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n with an unknown distribution function F . Here, we estimate the damage size
distribution. Common heavy-tailed models for such applications are the Pareto CDF,
FP (x;u1) = 1− (x/u1)
−α, x > u1 > 0 , α > 0 , (4)
and the Lognormal CDF,
FLN (x) = Φ
(
log(x)− µ
σ
)
(5)
where Φ is the CDF of a Normal(0, 1) random variable. That is, if X ∼Lognormal(µ, σ) then
log(X) ∼Normal(µ, σ). Further, these distributions may be restricted to a truncated support as,
F (x|u1 ≤ X ≤ u2) =
F (x)− F (u1)
F (u2)− F (u1)
, 0 < u1 < u2 , (6)
where u1 and u2 are lower and upper truncation points that define the smallest and largest observations
allowed under the model. Extending further, truncated distributions may be joined together to model
different layers of magnitude,
F2P (x|u1 ≤ X) = FP (x|u1 ≤ X ≤ u2)Pr{u1 ≤ X ≤ u2}+ FP (x|u2 ≤ X)Pr{u2 ≤ X}. (7)
In Appendix 1, the above models are considered for damage size from the entire observed time
period, leading to a clearer falsification of the assumption that the damage distribution is stationary.
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In fig. 1, there appears to be a change in the damage distribution around 1980. Further evidence of
a change is provided by the transition from steep to shallow decrease in frequency of events around
this time (fig. 2). It could be that this change was a reaction to the Three Mile Island disaster of
March 1979. It is plausible that the industry response involved both improving safety standards as
well as reporting more events; the first change being evidenced by the decreasing rate of events, and
the second by the higher proportion of small events being reported.
In fig. 4, the empirical complementary cumulative distribution functions (CCDFs) are plotted for
damage values (above 20 MM US$) occuring before 1980 (44 points) and after 1980 (59 points). The
distributions are clearly different. Indeed, the KS test [45], with the null hypothesis that the data for
both subsets come from the same model, gives a p-value of 0.015. The pre-1980 data, having median
damage size of 283 MM US$, has a higher central tendency than the post-1980 data, having a median
damage size of 77 MM US$. However, the post-1980 distribution has a heavier tail, whereas the pre-
1980 distribution decays exponentially. It is a rather well-known observation that improved safety and
control in complex engineering systems tends to suppress small events, but often at the expense of more
and/or larger occasional extreme events [38, 40, 23]. This raises the question whether the observed
change of regime might belong to this class of behavior, as a result of the improved technology and
risk management introduced after 1980?
We also considered that there could have been a change point after Chernobyl. However, the
empirical CDFs for intervals 1980-1989 and 1990-2014 were qualitatively similar, and the KS test gave
a p-value of 0.98. Thus, the damage size distribution has remained very stable since 1980.
Thus, we focus on estimating the left-truncated (u1) Pareto (eq. 4) for the post-1980 data. The
estimate α̂(u1) is stable in the range of 0.5-0.6 for 20 < u1 < 1000 (in MM US$ units), indicating
that the data is consistent with the model. For u1 < 20, the estimate of α is smaller, as is typical
for datasets where small events are under-reported. In [39], the estimated value was slightly larger
(α = 0.7), while Ref. [21] found also values between 0.6 and 0.8. With our more complete dataset, the
smaller value α in the range of 0.5 − 0.6 is consistent with previous studies but tends to emphasize
an even more extremely heavy tailed model (α ≤ 1) where the mean value is infinite mathematically.
In practice, this simply means that the largest event in a given catalog accounts for a major fraction
(∼ 1− α) of the total dollar cost of the whole [37].
5 INES, NAMS & DKs
5.1 Comparison between INES and NAMS
There are many ways to quantify a nuclear accident. Following Chernobyl, several authors proposed
to use a monetary value of damage severity to make events comparable, and use a rate measure
normalized by the number of reactor operating years to consider frequency [22, 34, 35]. This is what we
have done. Since the IAEA uses a different metric, namely the International Nuclear and Radiological
Event Scale (INES), it is instructive to compare the two approaches. First, the INES is a discrete scale
between 1 (anomaly) and 7 (major accident). Similarly to the Mercalli intensity scale for earthquakes
(which has 12 levels from I (not felt) to XII (total destruction)), each level in the INES is intended to
roughly correspond to an order of magnitude in severity (in the amount of radiation released). The
INES has been criticized for instance in [36] (and references therein).
Common criticisms include that the evaluation of INES scores is not objective and may be misused
as a public relations (propoganda) tool; moreover, the scores are not published, not all events have
INES scores, no estimate of risk frequency is provided, and so on. Given confusion over the INES
scoring of the Fukushima disaster, nuclear experts have stated that the “INES emergency scale is very
likely to be revisited” [12]. In [36], the Nuclear Accident Magnitude Scale (NAMS) was proposed as
an objective and continuous alternative to INES. The NAMS magnitude is M = log10(20R) where R
is the amount of radiation released in terabecquerels. The constant 20 makes NAMS matching INES
as much as possible on reference events.
This proposition to go from the INES to the NAMS is reminiscent of the replacement of the discrete
Mercalli intensity scale by the continuous Richter scale with no upper limit, which is also based on the
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logarithm of energy radiated by earthquakes. In the earthquake case, the Mercalli scale was invented
more than a hundred years ago as an attempt to quantify earthquake sizes in the absence of reliable
seismometers. As technology evolved, the cumbersome and subjective Mercalli scale was progressively
replaced by the physically based Richter scale. In contrast, the INES scale looks somewhat backward
from a technical and instrumental point of view, but was created in 1990 by the International Atomic
Energy Agency as an effort to facilitate consistent communication on the safety significance of nuclear
and radiological events, while more quantitative measures are available.
Here, we perform a statistical back-test of the accuracy of INES scores in relation to the damage
(although INES is not defined in terms of financial damage) and NAMS. We have collected 72 INES
scores. In the dataset, 74 percent of Western European events have an INES score, 68 percent of
Eastern European events, and only 26 percent of Asian ones, and 20 percent of North American ones.
The INES scores are plotted over time in fig. 1. There is a clear drop in INES scores after 1980. The
damage values also tend to drop, but not to the same extent, possibly indicating underestimation of
INES scores since 1980.
In fig. 5, we plot both the log10 transform of damage and NAMS versus INES. There is an approx-
imate linear relationship between INES and log damage (intercept (at INES= 0) 0.64 (0.3) and slope
0.43 (0.08) by linear regression). This is consistent with the concept that each INES increment should
correspond to an order of magnitude in severity. However, damage grows approximately exponentially
(100.43 ≈ e1) rather than in multiples of 10 with each INES level. Further, the upper category (7)
clearly contains events too large to be consistent with the linear relationship. For instance, the largest
event (Fukushima) would need to have an INES score of 10.6 to coincide with the fitted line. In
addition, the damage sizes of INES level 3 do not appear statistically different form the sizes of INES
level 4. Finally, there is considerable uncertainty in the INES scores as evidenced by the overlapping
damage values. There is an approximate linear relationship between INES and NAMS (at INES= 3
the intercept is 1.8 (0.9) and slope 1.7 (0.2) by linear regression). One sees from the points, and that
the slope of the line is greater than 1, that large radiation release events have been given an INES level
that is too small. Furthermore, some INES level 3 events should be INES level 2. This illustrates the
presence of significant inconsistency of INES scores in terms of radiation release level definitions.
5.2 Evidence for “dragon-kings” (DKs)
Fig. 5 shows that the distribution of NAMS is well described by the Exponential distribution for
NAMS values between 2 until 5, similarly to results reported in Ref. [36]. Because the NAMS value of an
event isM = log10(20R) where R is the amount of radiation released in terabecquerels, the exponential
distribution of NAMS values translates into a Pareto distribution for the radiation released, which is
valid over 3 decades. However, the four events with NAMS scores above 5 (Chernobyl, Three Mile
Island, Fukushima, and Kyshtym – see table 1) – all being between 7 and 8 – are not only larger than
what would be predicted by extrapolating the estimated Pareto model, but also form a neat cluster.
NAMS level 5 appears to be a threshold above which runaway disasters occur, and these disasters tend
to belong to their own regime.
This could be caused by a number of things. For instance, at a certain point, the event becomes
uncontrollable due to a cascade of dysfunctions and failures. The term “dragon-king” has been intro-
duced to refer the situation where extreme events appear that do not belong to the same distribution as
their smaller siblings [38, 40]. In general, this results from transient amplification mechanisms, such as
in the phenomenon of attractor bubbling in riddled basins of attraction of generic dynamical systems
[14].
Let us now make the above observation more rigorous. We estimate the Exponential distribution
for NAMS above u1 = 3.5 (a plausible level below which the data is likely incomplete) by maximum
likelihood where the four suspected DK events are censored [15]. That is, to avoid the DK points
biasing estimation, we ignore their size but include in the estimation the information that the 4 points
exist and are larger than the largest non-DK point. The result is α̂NAMS = 0.72 (0.3) with sample size
n = 15. From fig. 5, it is clear that the DK points are well above the fitted line. There are many tests
available to determine if large observations are significantly outlying relative to the Exponential (or
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Pareto) distribution [10, 46, 31]. The power of these tests relies upon having a large enough sample
size, and that the outliers are also generated from something like an Exponential distribution with a
relatively large scale parameter. Here the sample size above which the Exponential distribution is valid
is small (15 points above 3.5, of which 4 appear to be outliers), and the points form a dense cluster.
Thus, a more suitable approach to assess the outliers is by estimating a mixture of an Exponential and
a Normal density,
fNAMS(x|x > 3.5) = παexp{−αx}+ (1− π)φ(x;µ, σ) , α, σ > 0 , (8)
where the Gaussian density φ(x;µ, σ) provides the outlier regime, and 0 ≤ π ≤ 1 is a weight. This
model will allow us to classify points as either outliers or not. The Maximum Likelihood estimation
of this model (eq. 8) is done using an Expectation Maximization algorithm [32, 11]. The estimates of
this (alternative) model are (π̂ = 0.74, α̂ = 0.80, µ̂ = 7.68, σ̂ = 0.29). We also consider a null model
with no DK regime (π = 1). For this the MLE is α̂ = 0.6. The alternative model has a significantly
superior log-Likelihood (the p-value of the likelihood ratio test [47] is 0.04). Thus there is a statistically
significant DK regime relative to the Exponential. Further, it is highly probable that the 4 largest
points belong to the DK regime: based on the model (eq. 8), the probability that the largest through
the fourth largest points come from the DK regime are (0.97, 0.97, 0.97, 0.94), whereas the fifth largest
and smaller points have virtually zero probability of coming from the DK regime.
That the amount of damage is related to the amount of radiation released suggests to test for a
DK regime in the damage sizes. Not every runaway radiation release disaster produces commensurate
financial damage (see Three Mile Island and Kyshtym in table 1). But, given that the majority of
nuclear power installations have surrounding population densities higher than Fukushima [3], the DK
regime in radiation should amplify damage tail risks. In fig. 5, we have plotted the CCDF of the
damage sizes occurring after 1980.
Indeed, one can observe that the NAMS and log damage CCDFs are similar. Further, for the
log damage CCDF, there are three apparent DK events (Fukushima, Chernobyl, Tsuruga), two of
which are in the DK regime in the radiation release distribution, and the third which has an unknown
radiation release value. The MLE for the Exponential distribution, with the 3 largest points censored,
with u1 = 30 and n = 55 is α̂ = 0.61 (0.14). Given that α̂ falls within 1 standard deviation of α̂NAMS,
these censored distributions do not have significantly different parameters. Performing the statistical
DK test of [31] for the 3 largest events, with u1 ranging from 20 to 300 (having 54 and 13 percent
of observations above respectively), we obtain median and quantile p-values (0.086, 0.099, 0.11). That
the test is consistent for a wide range of values u1 provides evidence that the 3 largest events come
from a heavier tailed model than a Pareto with α̂ = 0.61.
But, with such a small sample size it is difficult to characterize the DK regime of damage. The
largest points appear to continue to follow a straight line in fig. 5. Thus we will continue with the
Pareto model. The MLE for the top 5 points is α̂(u1 = 1100) = 0.4 (0.19). To pursue a pleasant
but non-rigorous argument, this appears to be consistent with the run-away effect that propels NAMS
values fromM ≈ 5 to M ≈ 8. That is, transforming back from log scale, this same effect on the Pareto
model would transform the parameter α to α(u1 = 1000)
∗ = 58 × 0.61 = 0.375 ≈ α̂(u1 = 1000).
6 Modelling Total Future Damage
6.1 Aggregate Distribution of Damage
Having estimated the rate of events in sec. 3, the severity distribution in. 4, and identified the DK
regime in sec. 5, we here combine these models in a Compound Poisson Process (CPP) (for references,
e.g., [48, 28]) to model the annual total damage,
Yt =
Nt∑
i=1
Xi,t ∼ CompPois(vtλt,F ) , (9)
where for each year t = 1980, 1981, . . . , 2014 there are a random number of events Nt , modeled by a
Poisson process with annual rate vtλt, and each event has a random size Xi,t
i.i.d.
∼ F, F (20) = 0, i =
8
1, . . . , Nt (the unit is as before 1 MM UD$). For the rate, we take λ̂2014 between 0.002 and 0.003. For
F , we take the estimated Pareto damage distribution (eq. 4 with u1 = 20 and α̂ = 0.55). We also
consider FDK which is a two layer model (eq. 7) where the upper layer is for the DK regime. The first
layer, from u1 = 20 to u2 = 1100 is Pareto with α̂1 = 0.55 (0.15) estimated by MLE. The second layer,
from u2 = 1100 onwards, is also Pareto with heavier tail α̂2 = 0.4.
Given vt, λt, and F , we can calculate the “aggregate” distribution G for annual damage Yt. We
do this for the year 2014 with the Panjer algorithm (with discretization grid size 10) as well as by
Monte-Carlo [48, 28]. Fig. 6 shows the distributions F and FDK along with the Monte-Carlo aggregate
distributions, G, computed for λ taking values (0.002, 0.0025, 0.003), as well as for both distributions
F and FDK . The aggregate distribution starts as G(0) = 1 − P{Y2014 = 0} = 1 − exp{−v2014λ2014}
which follows from the Poisson model for Nt. Quantiles of the estimated G are in table 4. The 0.99
quantile is sensitive to the choice of λ and distribution F . For the lowest rate λ = 0.002 and without
considering the DK effect, the 0.99 quantile is 54,320 (MM US$), which is almost double the estimated
damage of Chernobyl. For λ = 0.0025, we obtain a similar estimate to [21], who obtained 81,000 (MM
US$). Considering the highest rate λ = 0.003 with the DK effect, this quantile is 331,610 (MM US$),
which is double the estimated damage of Fukushima.
To estimate return periods with the CPP model, one considers
Pr
[
{# events with size ≥ x(j) in τ years > 0}
]
= exp
[
−λvτPr{X ≥ x(j)}
]
, (10)
which is the probability of observing at least one event, at least as large as some size (e.g., given by
an order statistic x(j)), in a given time period τ . One sets equation (10) to a given probability p and
solves for the return period τj(p) of the jth largest event. Setting p = e
−1, one obtains the standard
return period τj(e
−1) = 1
λvPr{X≥x(j)}
.
Under the model with λ = 0.003, v = 388 and distribution FDK , the probability of annual damage
size of, or larger than, Fukushima is 1 − G(x(1)) ≈ 1.3%, giving a return period of 75 years. In the
same way, Chernobyl, and Three-Mile-Island sized damage events have 40, and 15 year return periods,
respectively.
An alternative characterisation of expression (10) is that, in terms of losses, there is a 50% chance
that (i) a Fukushima event (or larger) occurs in the next 50 years, (ii) a Chernobyl event (or larger)
occurs in the next 27 years and (iii) a TMI event (or larger) occurs in the next 10 years.
However, there is tremendous estimation uncertainty associated with these estimations.
6.2 Expected Yearly Damage
So far we have considered models without a limiting damage size, in which the mean damage is
infinite, since our various estimations of the Pareto exponent α all converge to values less than 1 [37].
Of course, the Earth itself is finite, thus there is an upper cut-off u2 to the maximum possible damage.
But this upper cut-off could be exceedingly large and there is yet no evidence of a maximum being
reached thus far (i.e., no accumulation of observations at an upper limit in fig. 4). Think for instance
of the real-estate value of New York City in the USA or of Zurich in Switzerland, both rather close to a
nuclear plant in operation, which would become inhabitable in a worst case scenario. Here, we would be
speaking of up to tens of trillions of dollars and Swiss francs of financial losses, not to speak of human
ones. Thus, insurance and re-insurance companies introduce a maximum loss for their liabilities, which
for them works as if there is a genuine upper cut-off u2. Everything above such a cut-off is then the
responsibility of the government(s) and society. For the truly extreme catastrophes, only the state can
be the insurer of last resort.
It is useful to put hard numbers behind these considerations and consider some scenarios. For the
CPP (eq. 9), the mean and variance of the yearly damage are
E[Yt] = λtvtE[X], V ar(Yt) = λtvtE[X
2] . (11)
Given lower and upper truncations u1 and u2, the first two moments for the Pareto are
E[X] =
α
α− 1
[
u1−α1 − u
1−α
2
u−α1 − u
−α
2
]
, E[X2] =
α
α− 2
[
u2−α1 − u
2−α
2
u−α1 − u
−α
2
]
. (12)
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Thus the mean grows in proportion to u1−α2 (and the variance faster as u
2−α
2 ). In table 5, we compute
these moments of the losses X when the maximum value u2 is equal to the present estimate of the
damage of Fukushima, ten times greater, and one hundred times greater. Since the expected annual
number of events λ̂2014v2014 is approximately 1, these values provide a rough estimation of the mean
and standard deviation of yearly damage in 2014 (eq. 11).
If we accept that the Fukushima event represents the largest typical possible damage, table 5 shows
that the mean yearly loss is approximately 1.5 Billion USD with a standard error of 8 Billion USD.
This brackets the construction cost of a large nuclear plant, suggesting that about one full equivalent
nuclear power plant value could be lost each year, on average (most years, there is little loss, and once
in a while a “dragon-king” hits). If we assume that the largest typical possible damage is about 10
times that of the estimated damage of Fukushima, then the average yearly loss is about 5.5 Billion
USD with a very large dispersion of 55 Billion USD.
Indeed, the outlook is even more dire for larger possible upper-cutoffs. Such numbers do not appear
to be taken into account in standard calculations on the economics of nuclear power (see for instance
www.world-nuclear.org/info/Economic-Aspects/Economics-of-Nuclear-Power). To be fair, we
should also note that the long-term effect on, say, lung cancer risks and other particle pollution induced
deaths, are not taken into account in evaluating the cost-benefits of alternative sources of energy such
as coal.
7 Discussion & Policy Conclusions
Our study makes important conclusions about the risks of nuclear power. Regarding event fre-
quency, we have found that the rate of incidents and accidents at civil nuclear installations decreased
from the 1970s until the present time. Along the way, there was a significant drop in the rate of events
after Chernobyl (April, 1986). Since then the rate has been roughly stable, implying a rate of 0.002 to
0.003 events per plant per year in 2015. This modeling of rate was found to be robust when changing
the Poisson distribution for event counts to the Negative Binomial distribution. Our use of the Poisson
process acknowledges the substantial variation in annual event counts, while being more conservative
than the Negative Binomial.
Regarding event severity, we found that the distribution of damage sizes underwent a significant
regime change shortly after the Three Mile Island major accident. Moderate damage events were
suppressed but extreme ones became more frequent to the extent that the damage sizes are now well
described by the extremely heavy tailed Pareto distribution with parameter α ≈ 0.55. We noted in the
introduction that the Three Mile Island accident in 1979 led to plant specific full-scope control room
simulators, plant specific PRA models for finding and eliminating risks and new sets of emergency
operating instructions. The change of regime that we document here may be the concrete embodiment
of these changes catalized by the TMI accident. We also identify statistically significant runaway dis-
aster (“dragon-king”) regimes in both NAMS (radiation release) and damage, suggesting that extreme
damage events are amplified to values even larger than those explained under the Pareto distribution
with α ≈ 0.55.
In view of the extreme risks, the need for better bonding and liability instruments associated with
nuclear accident and incident property damage becomes clear. For instance, under the conservative
assumption that the financial damage from Fukushima is the maximum possible damage, accident costs
are on par with construction costs, with the expected yearly loss being $1.5 billion with a standard
deviation of $8 billion. If we do not limit the maximum possible damage, then the expected damage
under the estimated Pareto model is mathematically infinite. Nuclear reactors are thus assets that can
become liabilities in a matter of hours, and it is usually taxpayers, or society at large, that “pays” for
these accidents rather than nuclear operators or even electricity consumers. This split of incentives
improperly aligns those most responsible for an accident (the principals) from those suffering the cost
of nuclear accidents (the agents). One policy suggestion is that we start holding operators liable for
accident costs through an environmental or accident bonding system [42].
Third, looking to the future, our analysis suggests that nuclear power has inherent safety risks that
will likely recur. With the current model, in terms of losses, there is a 50% chance that (i) a Fukushima
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event (or larger) occurs in the next 50 years, (ii) a Chernobyl event (or larger) occurs in the next 27
years and (iii) a TMI event (or larger) occurs in the next 10 years. Further, smaller but still expensive
(≥ 20 MM 2013 USD) incidents will occur with a frequency of about one per year. To curb these risks
of future events would require sweeping changes to the industry, as perhaps triggered by Fukushima,
which include refinements to reactor operator training, human factors engineering, radiation protection,
and many other areas of nuclear power plant operations. To be effective, any changes need to minimize
the risk of extreme “dragon-king” disasters. Unfortunately, given the shortage of data, it is too early
to judge if the risk of events has significantly improved post Fukushima. We can only raise attention to
the fact that similar sweeping regime changes after both Chernobyl (leading to a decrease in frequency)
and Three Mile Island (leading to a suppression of moderate events) failed to mitigate the very heavy
tailed distribution of losses documented here.
A separate conclusion of our article concerns the nature of data about nuclear incidents and acci-
dents. We found that the INES scale of the IAEA is highly inconsistent, and the scores provided by
the IAEA incomplete. For instance, only 40 percent of the events in our database have INES scores.
Further, for the damage values to be consistent with the INES scores, the Fukushima disaster would
need to be between an INES level of 10 and 11, rather than the maximum level of 7. The INES
scale was compared to the antiquated Mercalli scale for earthquake magnitudes, which was replaced
by the continuous physically-based Richter scale. Clearly an objective continuous scale such as the
NAMS would be superior to the INES. However, while using INES, scores should be made available
for all accidents. When such a framework is established, and data on incidents and accidents made
more rigorous, and transparent, accident risks can be better understood, and perhaps even minimised
through positive learning.
Finally, our study opens a number of avenues for future research. Our results have been obtained
for the current fleet, dominated in large part by Generation II reactors. A future research would be
to investigate how much of the specific risks for each reactor type or design can be inferred from sta-
tistical analysis, with the goal of identifying which of the reactors are the safest. In addition to the
role of technology, another natural extension would be to correlate accidents to the type of market or
form of regulatory governance, restructured versus monopoly/state run, or limited liability versus no
limited liability. Our focus on the risks of civil nuclear power plants might give the impression that
this industry is very risky indeed, more risky that other competing technologies such as coal or wind
energy for instance. Due to the more diluted nature of the costs, the quasi-hysteric focus on nuclear
risks following the Fukushima disaster may hide an insidious villain: it has been estimated that there
are about 58 000 premature deaths each year in Europe and tens of billions of euros are spent on health
spending; 7 million people a year worldwide, including more than a million Chinese, die each year from
air pollution by fine particles, according to a 25 March 2014 release of the World Health Organiza-
tion (http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2014/air-pollution/en/). Coal, whose
global use has soared by 50% from 2000 to 2010, is the leading issuer of fine particles, which are em-
bedded in the lungs, causing cancers. Between 2010 and 2012, the European coal consumption jumped
5%, or 50 million tons. Thus, performing a rigorous empirically based comparative analysis of the risks
of nuclear versus other forms of energy providers is absolutely essential to avoid falling in the traps of
media hypes and availability biases, in the goal of a better steering of our societies.
11
8 Appendix 1: Stationary Damage Distribution
Here we consider damage values for the entire observed time period and estimate a stationary model
to this data. The empirical complementary CDF (CCDF) is plotted in fig. 7. The CCDF appears to
be either concave in double log scale, or have approximately two linear regime with a change point
around 800. In such a plot, a pure Pareto CCDF (eq. 4) would qualify as a straight line with slope
−α. Thus, we consider a range of models:
(i) a “pure” left-truncated Pareto (eq. 4 with u1 = 20),
(ii) a left-truncated Lognormal (eq. 5 plugged into eq. 6 with u1 = 20), and
(iii) a model with two layers (7) where both layers are Pareto, the first layer starts at u1 = 20 and
the layers are split at the apparent change point u2 = 800.
There are 100 observations above 20 and 23 above 800. The Pareto models may be estimated by
MLE [6]. The left-truncated Lognormal may also be estimated by MLE [20] and tested against a
left-truncated Pareto estimate [27]. For the two layer model, the distributions are estimated separately
on their respective (disjoint) samples. And, the probability weights are given empirical estimates,
e.g., P̂ r{u2 ≤ X} =
∑n
1 1{xi>u2}
n
. The estimated model parameters are summarized in table 6. The
parameter for the pure Pareto model was estimated for a variety of lower truncation points. From
this (see fig. 7), it is clear that there are approximately two Pareto “regimes”. The first from damage
around 20 MM US$, and the second starting around 800 MM US$. From fig. 7, it is also clear that the
Lognormal and two layer Pareto are competitive models, whereas the pure Pareto has bad residuals.
All models have some difficulty for damage values around 100 MM US$ due to irregularities in the
empirical CCDF. However, the competitive models perform well in the tail as evidenced by the small
residuals.
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Table 1: The 15 largest damage events are provided with the date, location, damage in MM 2013USD,
INES score, and NAMS score.
Date Location Damage INES NAMS
2011-03-11 Fukushima Prefecture, Japan 166088.7 7 7.5
1986-04-26 Chernobyl, Kiev, Ukraine 32078.5 7 8.0
1995-12-08 Tsuruga, Japan 15500.0 NA NA
1957-09-11 Rocky Flats, USA 8189.0 5 5.2
1955-03-25 Sellafield, UK 4400.0 4 4.3
1977-01-01 Beloyarsk, USSR 3500.0 5 NA
1955-07-14 Sellafield, UK 2900.0 3 -2.4
1979-03-28 Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania, USA 2773.4 5 7.9
1969-10-12 Sellafield, UK 2500.0 4 2.3
1957-09-29 Kyshtym, Chelyabinsk, Soviet Union 2351.4 6 7.3
1985-03-09 Athens, Alabama, USA 2114.3 NA NA
1977-02-22 Jaslovske Bohunice, Czechoslovakia 1964.5 4 NA
1968-05-01 Sellafield, UK 1900.0 4 4.0
1955-11-29 Idaho Falls, Idaho, United States 1500.0 4 NA
1971-03-19 Sellafield, UK 1330.0 3 3.2
Table 2: Parameter estimate, standard error, and p-value for rate estimates. The first four rows
give estimates for the two model specifications (GLM and NLM) for two starting times (1970 and
1980). The last two rows give GLM estimates for (Pre-Chernobyl) 1970-1986, and (Post-Chernobyl)
1986-2014. The intercept is given at the starting time.
Model β0 β1 β2
GLM 1970 −4.16 (0.219), 10−16 −0.049 (0.010), 10−7 = 1
GLM 1980 −4.69 (0.227), 10−16 −0.046 (0.015), 10−3 = 1
NLM 1970 −3.03 (0.11), 10−11 −0.979 (0.204), 10−5 0.277 (0.070), 10−4
NLM 1980 −4.67 (0.32), 10−3 −0.04 (0.11), 0.7 1.05 (0.82), 0.2
GLM Pre-Ch. −4.24 (0.34), 10−16 −0.024 (0.033), 0.46 = 1
GLM Post-Ch. −5.50 (0.32), 10−16 −0.015 (0.02), 0.45 = 1
Table 3: By region: number of events (N) and number of reactor years (v) from 1980 through 2014,
the rate of events per reactor year, and the Poisson standard error of the rate.
Region N v λ̂RUN1980,2014 std.
North America 31 4212 0.0074 0.001
Western Europe 12 4813 0.0025 0.001
Eastern Europe 5 1154 0.0043 0.002
Asia 13 3713 0.0035 0.001
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Table 4: The estimated 0.95 and 0.99 quantiles, as well as the probability of the annual damage
exceeding the largest event x(1) = 166, 089 (Fukushima) are given for the aggregate distribution G.
The Pareto model is with u1 = 20, α = 0.55, and the Pareto DK model is with u1 = 20 u2 =
1100, α1 = 0.55, α2 = 0.4. The volume (number of active nuclear plants) is taken to be v2014 = 388.
The quantiles are given in MM 2013USD.
Model λ q0.95 q0.99 Pr{Yt ≥ x(1)}
Pareto 0.002 2950 54320 0.0054
0.0025 4440 82440 0.0068
0.003 6200 115780 0.0082
Pareto DK 0.002 2180 120730 0.0088
0.0025 3720 220510 0.011
0.003 5880 331610 0.013
Table 5: The first moment and the square root of the second moment of X are given by the first
and second value respectively. The Pareto model is with u1 = 20, α = 0.55 and three values for the
maximum value u2. The Pareto DK model is with u1 = 20 u2 = 1100, α1 = 0.55, α2 = 0.4 and
three values for the maximum value u3. The maximum values are 1, 10, and 100 times the damage of
Fukushima, x(1) = 166, 089 MM US$. All units of losses are in MM US$.
Model x(1) 10 × x(1) 100× x(1)
Pareto 1513, 8253 5367, 54590 20488, 349736
Pareto DK 1404, 8466 3982, 45267 11250, 240810
Table 6: Parameter estimates for the three models considered for the damage size distribution in
Appendix 1. The estimated parameters with standard errors, log-likelihood, and KS test and AD test
[45] p-values are given for each model.
model θ̂ logL pks pad
Pareto α̂ = 0.43 (0.02) −183.3 0.11 0.07
Lognormal µ̂ = 3.06 (1.2) σ̂ = 2.85 (0.5) −178.3 0.73 0.67
2 Layer Pareto α̂1 = 0.27 (0.10) α̂2 = 0.87 (0.16) −177.5 0.67 0.62
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Figure 1: Left frame: plot of damage sizes over time with the 20 MM USD threshold given by the
dashed line. Right frame: INES scores over time with noise added for visibility.
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Figure 2: The main frame of the left plot: The annual observed frequencies are given by the solid dots
with standard errors. The standard errors are computed assuming that the counts follow a Poisson
process: Var(λt) =
λt
vt
. The running rate estimate (eq.1) from 1970 onwards is the grey line, with
dashed lines giving standard errors. The solid black lines are the Poisson regressions from 1970 to
2014 and 1980 to 2014. The dashed black lines are the non-linear regressions of observed frequencies
from 1970 to 2014 and 1980 to 2014. The second line is hidden beneath the solid black lines. The
x marks on the horizontal axis give the dates of the Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima
disasters. Inset frame: The estimated rate (with standard error) at 2014 using the Generalized Linear
Model (GLM) model (eq. 2) where estimates were taken at a sequence of starting points, providing
the horizontal axis. Center frame: the number of operational reactors over time [7] where the bottom
layer is the United States, the second layer is Western Europe, the third layer is Eastern Europe, and
the top layer is Asia. Right frame: The cumulative number of events (of size greater than 20 MM
US$) over time. The vertical dashed line indicates when the volume of operating facilites becomes
stable. The line (with slope 1.33) provides the expected slope of the cumulative number of events if
the rate of events were constant since 1990 (the slope is given by the product of the rate estimate (1)
̂λRUN1990,2011 = 0.0034 (0.0008) and of the volume (number of functioning nuclear plants) v1990 ≈ v2011.
The inset frame provides the residuals between the cumulative number of events and the lines when
its intercept is set at the first point.
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Figure 3: The annual observed frequencies, computed for 2 year periods, are given by the solid dots
with standard errors. The standard errors are computed assuming that the counts follow a Poisson
process: Var(λt) =
λt
vt
. The solid lines and standard errors are the Poisson GLM regressions (eq. 2),
of the annual frequencies, from 1970 until Chernobyl (April 1986), and from Chernobyl until 2014.
The dark green volume is the standard error of the GLM Poisson regression. The larger lighter green
volume is the same but for a Negative Binomial distribution (e.g., see [28]) rather than the Poisson.
This somewhat better captures the variation in annual frequencies, however for simplicity we retain the
Poisson model. Capturing about 60 percent of observed frequencies within 1 standard error indicates
that these models are both reasonable.
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Figure 4: The main frame plots the empirical CCDFs (for damage above 20MM occurring after 1980)
for pre and post 1980 data. The pre 1980 CCDF has solid dots and is above the post 1980 CCDF for
the first 2.5 decades. The black line is a Pareto (eq. 4) CCDF with u2 = 30, α = 0.55 fit to the post
1980 data. The bottom left inset frame plots the residuals between the Pareto CDF and the empirical
CDF. The top right inset frame provides the estimate (plus-minus 1 standard error) of the Pareto
model for a range of lower truncation values.
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Figure 5: In the left frame, we plot both the log10 transform of damage (black dots) and the NAMS
score (grey dots) versus the INES score. The Nuclear Accident Magnitude Scale (NAMS) of an event
is defined by M = log10(20R) where R is the amount of radiation released in terabecquerels. The star
and black vertical lines give the mean and standard errors of the logarithmic damages. The points have
been shifted around their INES score for visibility, but they all correspond to integer INES values. The
black and grey slope lines provide linear regressions on the points of their same colour. In the right
frame we plot, from left to right, the CCDF of INES scores above 2 (shifted left by 1), the CCDF of
NAMS scores above 2, and the CCDF of the natural logarithm of post 1980 damage sizes (shifted right
by 2). For the center and right CCDFs, the dots with x marks indicate Dragon King (DK) regime
points. The dashed lines show the Exponential distribution estimates where points above the largest
non-DK point have been censored.
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Figure 6: The estimated Pareto CCDF (u1 = 20, α = 0.55) for damage size and the Pareto CCDF with
DK regime ( u1 = 20 u2 = 1100, α1 = 0.55, α2 = 0.4) are given by the solid black lines. The second
CCDF is shifted right by a factor of 10. They dashed grey lines provide the aggregate distributions, G,
for v2014 = 388, and λt taking values (0.002, 0.0025, 0.003). The aggregate distributions were computed
by Monte-Carlo simulation with 5× 106 independent samples of annual damage.
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Figure 7: The left frame plots the empirical and estimated complementary cumulative distribution
functions (CCDF) in double logarithmic scale. The grey dots give the empirical CCDF (for damage
above 20MM) evaluated at each observed value. The dashed line is the Lognormal estimate with left
truncation at u1 = 20 MM US$ (eq. 5). The solid line is the estimated two-layer model (eq. 7). The
top-right frame provides the estimate (plus-minus 1 standard error) of the pure (one layer) Pareto
model (eq. 4) for a range of lower truncation values (in units of MM US$). The vertical lines give
u1 and u2 used in the other models. The large circle denotes the estimated value for the upper layer
CDF of the 2 layer Pareto model. The bottom right frame plots the estimated CDF residuals (distance
between the empirical CDF and the CDF estimates). The black line is for the two layer Pareto, the
grey dashed line is the Lognormal estimate, and the solid grey line is the one layer Pareto estimate.
The x marks on the two layer Pareto residual line indicate the residuals for the 6 largest data points.
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